The Ghetto of Exclusion
and the Fortified Enclave

New Patterns in the United States

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Three key developments are described: (a) the transformation of the earlier racial ghettos into excluded ghettos, class/racial ghettos of the excluded and abandoned, resulting from a combination of hyperpauperization and racism; (b) a qualitatively new phase of the totalizing suburb, in which "edge cities" are created combining residential, business, social, and cultural areas that are removed from older central cities and overlaid on earlier patterns of suburbanization, representing a dramatic and expanded form of the exclusionary enclave; and (c) the parallel transformation of luxury and upper-class residences (and, increasingly, businesses and social and cultural facilities—thus similarly totalizing) into separate areas, appropriately called fortified citadels, each again separated from the other parts of the city by social, economic, and often physical barriers. The three developments are intimately connected with each other and mutually reinforcing.

Three spatial developments are strikingly characteristic of urban patterns in the United States since about 1970—the period sometimes designated "post-Fordist," the period of the major new changes described briefly in the opening article of this issue. The overarching phenomenon is the increasing separation of the parts of the city from each other, reflecting in space an increasing economic, social, and political separation. In our opening article, we described essentially five "quarters" of the city and the likely changes in each; here, I focus on changes in the abandoned city at the bottom of the hierarchy, the suburban city at the middle, and the luxury city at the top of that hierarchy.

These three key developments are the following:

the transformation of the earlier racial ghettos into excluded ghettos, class/racial ghettos of the excluded and abandoned, separated from the other parts of the city by social, economic, and often physical barriers;
a qualitatively new phase of totalizing suburban development, in which "edge cities" are created combining residential, business, social, and cultural areas, removed
from older central cities, overlaid on earlier patterns of suburbanization, and representing a dramatic and expanded form of the exclusionary enclave;
the parallel transformation of luxury and upper-class residences (and increasingly businesses and social and cultural facilities, thus similarly totalizing) into separate areas, appropriately called fortified citadels, each again separated from the other parts of the city by social, economic, and often physical barriers.

The three developments are intimately connected with each other and mutually reinforcing. They stem from significant changes in national and international structures, and the extent of their manifestation is influenced by the balance of political and economic power among the groupings and classes involved. Neither those changes nor the conflicting forces that influence their outcomes need to be described again here; they are amply documented in the literature. But that literature, although rich in description and analysis on other levels, has not focused on the concrete mechanisms by which these national and international forces and the conflicts in which they are involved produce specific spatial changes within cities. Indeed, in some ways, the globalization literature is misleading when it comes to looking at internal spatial structure. It focuses on the hierarchical lineup of cities and emphasizes the unique role of "world" or "global" cities, implying different patterns in those cities than in cities that do not meet their defining criteria. Yet, in fact, cities throughout the hierarchy (if that is indeed an appropriate term) display much the same patterns: Detroit manifests the development of the three critical contemporary developments in a way parallel to New York City, and Cleveland parallels Los Angeles. Concrete forms and locations differ from city to city, but the tendencies here described can be found in all. That is true, I believe, internationally as well as within the United States; Sao Paulo has patterns similar to those of London, Munich those of Tokyo, and Nan'ning those of Beijing. The emphasis on rank order and position in the international system of cities may thus unintentionally have led to the suggestion that cities at the top of the ranking have internal spatial processes inherently different from those elsewhere in the rank order. I think such a suggestion is contrary to the evidence. Indeed, some of the classic spatial patterns expected in cities such as New York City, including those described in this article, may be found in even more extreme form in a city such as Detroit (see, e.g., Sugrue, 1996). In this sense, the claims made in this article as to the development of new urban structures are broad and extend well beyond the cities often characterized as global.

In another sense, however, the claims of this article are more limited than some of the globalization literature would suggest might be appropriate. What is described here is not all the result of global changes, and those changes affect directly only a fraction of what happens in cities. The new patterns all build on older ones and are as much extensions of older patterns as brand new ones. Ghettoization based on race and class is, after all, nothing new; externally enforced spatial separation of groups has been one of the most invidious characteristics of urban development throughout history, and its recent extreme forms under the Nazis can scarcely be forgotten. Suburbanization, likewise, is
a long-standing trend; some studies date its origins to the streetcar suburbs of the late 19th century; others talk of forms of suburbanization in late medieval England. Exclusion always played a role in such suburbs, if often only relying on pricing to establish exclusivity, but in the 20th century, in the United States, it was clearly buttressed by a variety of legal institutions and physical markers. And citadels are nothing new; the ancient Near East had impressive ones, and the Dark Ages in Europe saw famous examples; colonial powers erected more subdued but perhaps more oppressive ones throughout the world. Only the specific characteristics of these developments described below can really be claimed to be new or distinctively post-Fordist.

Nor can the claim be sustained that these new globalizing developments characterize the lives of all residents of today’s cities, or perhaps even a majority of them. The conception that if a city is “global,” then all of it is global, is wrong. In fact, many—arguably, most—parts of most cities, including many at the top and many lower down in the hierarchy, are not directly involved with its global characteristics. One can, indeed, find linkages to global activities in almost every sphere of life: The clothing the most insular suburbanite wears may have been made in China, the price of his or her automobile (if he or she owns one) may be determined by international competitive forces, and the company that provided jobs in location A may have been, by the decision of some internationally constituted corporation, relocated to location B. But such linkages are simply a slightly different version of connections to the outside world that have long existed for most people: Jobs were relocated from the north to the south, goods purchased in one state were manufactured in another, and tastes were always constituted by foreign and domestic sources. Producer services directly amount to a small fraction of all employment in any city, including the most global; their impact on spatial patterns is only one of a great variety of impacts. And all are, of course, molded by the preexisting physical fabric of the city, the built environment. Much more work needs to be done to spell out, in relation to other forces, just what specifically global impact is. That it is not the only force in every sphere is, of course, obvious.

The changes we are talking about, then—the development of the excluded ghetto, of the exclusionary enclave into totalizing suburbs, and of the fortified citadel—are new phenomena that represent a combination of old and well-known processes with elements that are substantively new.

One of the difficulties in analysis is a matter of terminology: Are ghettos analogous to enclaves? Can one talk of ghettos of the rich, of elderly ghettos, of ghettos of the poor? Are middle-class suburbs middle-class ghettos? Is the Black ghetto in the United States comparable to the Jewish ghettos of the middle ages? Are the high-rise areas of concentration of business activity and the residence of business people—La Defenses and Battery Park cities and the fortified enclaves of Sao Paulo or Tokyo, Bogota or Manila—analogous to the high-density areas of concentration of lower income households in social housing, in these and other cities? Are they analogous in class terms, although different in physical terms, to the suburbanization resulting in edge cities? Are
immigrant enclaves and luxury high-rises functionally equivalent? Are edge cities simply bigger suburbs? Can one speak of exclusion in these new spatial clusters outside of older cities, when in fact there is substantial diversity in their populations? Is the nature of the boundaries—walled, spatial distance, social separation—the defining characteristic of these various forms of spatial development, or is it the fact of an exclusionary or segregated resident population, or the nature of that population, or the activities taking place within them, that defines them?

Simply a few words on how I am using terms in this article may thus be helpful. For purposes of this article, I use the term *areas of concentration* as the generic and then define the terms I want to use as follows:

A ghetto is a spatially concentrated area used to separate and limit a particular involuntarily and usually racially defined population group held to be, and treated as, inferior by the dominant society.

Two subcategories are differentiated within the general definition of ghetto: A traditional ghetto is a ghetto in which the confinement of residents is desired by the dominant interests of the society because that confinement facilitates a strong measure of control over residents' activities, activities that further dominant economic interests.

The new ghetto of the excluded is a ghetto in which race is combined with class in a spatially concentrated area where residents' activities are excluded from the economic life of the surrounding society, which does not profit significantly from its existence; the confinement of their residents to the ghetto is desired by the dominant interests out of fear that their activities, not controlled, may endanger the dominant social peace.

An enclave, on the other hand, is conceptually quite different: An enclave is a spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population group, self-defined by ethnicity or religion or otherwise, congregate as a means of enhancing their economic, social, political, and/or cultural development.

Three subcategories need to be differentiated within the general definition of enclave: immigrant enclaves, cultural enclaves, and exclusionary enclaves. The difference between the immigrant and the cultural enclave is not important for the purposes of the argument here. The exclusionary enclave, although not new, plays a new role today, both quantitatively and qualitatively. It differs from other forms of enclaves (although there are shared characteristics) in that its residents, intermediate and insecure in their economic, political, and social relationships to the outside community, wish to “protect” themselves from a perceived danger from below.

And I would differentiate a citadel from any of these forms: A citadel is a spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population group, defined by its position of superiority in power, wealth, or status in relation to its neighbors, congregate as a means of protecting or enhancing that position. They are exclusionary, through the use of social and/or physical means of fortification,
although in some the restrictions on access may be very subtle indeed. They protect established positions of superiority and power seen as secure, deserved, and permanent.

Central to these definitions is the relationship between residents and the remainder of society. The residents of ghettos stand in an inferior, generally dominated and exploited (although resisting) relationship to those outside. Those in enclaves are in between—if exploited, they nevertheless see themselves on the way up; if exploiting, they nevertheless see themselves as also subject to the power of others. And those in the citadels are at the top of the hierarchy, benefiting disproportionately from their economic and political relationship with others.

But all of these spatial concentrations inside (and outside) the cities of the present period exhibit two new characteristics: walling, in which they are each more and more cut off from their surroundings, symbolically or actually by walls, and a totalizing trend, in which each of them more and more internalizes within its boundaries all the necessities of life, from work to residence to entertainment to culture. The walls that form the boundary of the ghetto may be railroad tracks (an earlier pattern achieving symbolic status), a highway, a set of buildings, a topographical feature, a shift in building type, or simply a well-recognized line of social demarcation. I have described the walling-in aspect of the ghetto elsewhere (see Marcuse, 1994, 1997b); the extent, rather than the type, of walls is new. In this article, I would rather focus on other aspects of the current patterns.

What is new, then, I suggest, is a set of linked developments:

- the creation of the excluded ghetto;
- the major expansion of the exclusionary enclave into the totalizing suburb, economic and social as well as residential;
- the development of massive fortified and totalizing citadels in or close to central cities;
- the increasing separation of each from the other and from other parts of the city through fortification, walling in (for the ghetto) and walling out (for the exclusionary enclaves and the citadels), and increasing totalizing internalization of the environment for all aspects of daily life.

Although most of these patterns have strong historical antecedents and have been recognizable for some time, the combination of the totalizing trend and the exclusionary trend of the suburbs into what are now often called edge cities gives rise to a phenomenon that appears new: the totalizing suburb.

The totalizing suburb is a spatially concentrated development taking place outside of the central city and inner suburbs in which business activities, employment centers, and commercial and cultural facilities are brought together with residentially exclusionary enclaves in a form that permits diversity without including either the top or the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy.
The recognition of the excluded ghetto is by now widespread (for a recent discussion, see Marcuse, 1996). Two separate streams of analysis have contributed to the discussion, differing in their starting points and emphases but not necessarily inconsistent with each other. One places the central emphasis on race, the other on economic change and class. The former has been developed, logically enough, in the United States; the latter, although also receiving major attention here, has greater linkages to European experience. The key text dealing with the racial ghetto is Massey and Denton’s (1993) *American Apartheid*, although significant literature developing some of the issues has also appeared. William Julius Wilson (1991) has been the most productive of the commentators stressing the role of economic change and its relationship to class; his use of the term *the underclass* has probably been the most provocative contribution to the sociological literature in the past 20 years. Wilson’s substitution of the term *ghetto poor* for *underclass* suggests the linkage between race and class and its spatial component.

The excluded ghetto of today is not simply an extreme form of the traditional ghetto but a new form in which permanent exclusion from participation in the mainstream economy, whether formal or informal, has become its defining characteristic. The historical changes in the traditional ghetto that have produced the excluded ghetto include a range of contemporary economic forces—from post-Fordist changes in the organization of production to globalization to business activities to development of new informational technologies—and the political and social consequences of these forces interacting with entrenched patterns of racial discrimination and spatial segregation. The excluded ghetto is today both the home and the place of work of those whom Wilson (1991) calls the “ghetto poor.” Its characteristics have been often described. It is inseparably linked in the United States to racist patterns. One may thus speak of hypersegregation not as identical with exclusion but as very largely overlapping it, and the figures show little or no reduction in its extent despite more than four decades of formal governmental commitment to its abolition.

But one may speak, at the same time, of “hyperpauperization”: of the “new urban poor,” of the exclusion of an increasingly large segment of society from participation in the workforce, in either the formal or the legitimate informal sector of the economy. Unemployment figures do not capture the problem, for they generally rely on statistics derived from counts of persons attached to the labor force. Within the debate over welfare reform, there has always been an undercurrent of acknowledgment of the fact that many, indeed perhaps most, welfare recipients are not on welfare because they do not want to work or do not have skills necessary to secure work, but because there is no work paying a living wage available for them. In previous periods, unemployment was seen as cyclical, and if there was high unemployment, there was also the expectation that things would get better, that the business cycle was to blame, and that the problem was, if severe, temporary. That does not hold true today. It is at the
boom portion of a cycle (if the cyclical pattern indeed continues) that we find the ghetto poor who feel that (and from all available information probably correctly) they are permanently excluded from the labor force, hence the desperation and the heedlessness that underlie so much of the drug use and crime in the poorer sections of our cities today.

The increasing discussion within African American and civil rights circles of whether racism is a permanent feature of U.S. society is not unrelated to this pattern of hyperpauperization. For if the loss of jobs and the redistribution of jobs, nationally and internationally, affect primarily African Americans, and if this situation is permanent, then the position of many African Americans may also be permanent. Put together these two tendencies—hyperpauperization and continued racial discrimination—and the spatial result is the ghetto of the excluded.

The trend to totalize the environment of the ghetto is unmistakable. It is an ambivalent one. On one hand, residents of the ghetto have a strong desire for jobs, shopping, entertainment, and recreation that are readily accessible to them, thus conveniently located in or near the ghetto. On the other hand, many outside the ghettos, spurred by racism coupled with the perceived threats of crime and unpleasantness, also are happy to see ghetto residents stay within the ghettos. Public policy is at best also ambivalent, at worst fully supportive of such a totalization of life in the ghetto. The current policy of the empowerment zone legislation, for instance, as much of a formal urban policy as the United States now has, supports employers within the ghetto in hiring residents living in the ghetto, and the focus is on developing the ghetto, not creating opportunities outside as well as inside it. Thus, public policy in such legislation is increasing the separation, the walling in of the ghetto.\(^\text{13}\)

This almost total separation from the life of the rest of the traditional space, of the city, economic and social as well as physical, is also a characteristic, in quite different form, of the new totalizing suburb (as well as of today’s citadel). The totalizing exclusionary suburb is the other side of the coin of the excluded ghetto. If concern with crime is consistently given by a majority of urban residents as one, if not the main, concern they have with their neighborhood; if racism, conscious or not, is a component of that concern; and if social factors in general are a primary determinant of residential location, then the attempt to build a system of private defenses against crime is a plausible response. Sometimes, that defense can be created simply by distance. Both the extent and, even more, the nature of these suburbs have changed in recent years.

Exclusionary suburbs have indeed long been a characteristic of U.S. cities; much of the urban debate, not just in the academic literature but much more heatedly in the courts and the political arena, centered on attempts to counter the racial exclusivity that accompanied and largely contributed to the postwar suburban expansion. But it was characteristic of these suburbs that they were primarily residential. Commercial facilities, indeed, were provided to meet local shopping needs on a larger and larger scale as developments grew. The spread of shopping malls reflects that process; they serve primarily residential needs
and, until recently, focused on the middle of the market, not its specialized or extreme sectors. In a few cases, attempts were consciously made, usually under progressive stimulus, to integrate the provision of jobs with the provision of housing; Reston (Virginia) and Columbia (Maryland) are the outstanding examples in the United States. The British New Towns and the French Grand Villes are in the same tradition (indeed, established that tradition). But their essence was quite different from that of what are commonly called the edge cities of today. They were designed to attract those who were crowding into the cities, urban dwellers for whom there was no room in the existing urban centers. They were intended to be inclusive, not exclusive; indeed, subsidized housing lay at the heart of their housing provision, certainly in Britain and France and, in terms of the intent of their founders, in the United States.

Whether the new edge cities should be described as suburbs is a matter of definition, but there is a conceptual issue involved. If suburb is defined as primarily residential and dependent economically for the employment of its residents in the central city, then these are not suburbs. But if the concern is for the motivation leading to their creation, to their choice as a place to be by their residents, to their social character and their position in the hierarchies of space, then they are indeed suburbs. I assume here what has been called the "push hypothesis" about the creation of suburbs, at least in the postwar United States: that the growing concentration of Blacks in central cities and the related fears of crime and the spinoffs of poverty have accelerated movement to the suburbs many-fold. Lizabeth Cohen (1996) puts it bluntly: "Suburbanization must be seen as a new form of racial segregation in the face of a huge wave of African-American migration from the South to the North during the 1950's" (p. 1059). She is speaking of the suburbs of the postwar period, with their new accompaniment, the malls and shopping centers: When developers and store owners set out to make the shopping center a more perfect downtown, they aimed to exclude from this public space unwanted urban groups such as vagrants, prostitutes, racial minorities, and poor people.

This is the direct lineage of the "edge cities," and therefore I have chosen here to call them "totalizing suburbs" to indicate both this link to the etiology of the suburbs of the past and the new character that brings employment, culture, recreation, diversified shopping, and entertainment that are akin to that of the central city to them also. It is a total environment that is being created, not a partial one. As Neil Pierce, at least as perceptive a journalist as Joel Garreau, has pointed out, the movement of factories and offices out of the central cities has much to do with the same "pushes" (Pierce et al., 1993) that created the residential suburbs in the first place. Ultimate economic dependence on the central city may indeed still exist (just as ultimately, the economy of each city is also significantly dependent on the national economy, and it in turn on the international economy). But in terms of daily life and daily activities, these are indeed total urban environments.

But these total urban environments are only for those who are there. They do not include the entire spectrum of urban dwellers. At the top, they do not include
those with controlling positions in trade, industry, or finance; their centers remain in the central business district of the major cities. They are producing their own totalized environments, in the new citadels described below. Neither do the edge cities include the very poor, the unemployed, or the ghetto poor. It is striking how little the question of race appears in discussions of edge cities in the popular press, or in Garreau’s (1991) original book introducing the phrase into the public discourse. Attention is indeed placed on having a range of housing available, so that not only the symbol manipulators and branch office managers and budding entrepreneurs can live there but also school teachers, police officers, store clerks, and typists. But that does not mean the uneducated, the welfare recipients, the long-term unemployed, the substance abusers—and poor Blacks. There is nothing fundamentally against middle-class Blacks, indeed, in most edge cities, although they suffer from discrimination there as elsewhere. And Hispanics who are needed for more menial work, gardening or domestic work, may be admitted too, although reverse commuting is often the pattern.16

Totalizing is also an appropriate term for what is happening in the citadels of power in the central cities, and occasionally outside of them, in the United States and elsewhere. The reference here is to the developments such as Battery Park City in New York City, La Defense in Paris, Docklands in London, the three new central business districts of Sao Paulo, Shinjuku in Tokyo, the Renaissance Center in Detroit, the underground city center of Montreal, and countless others. But it is not only newly built centers that exhibit the characteristics of citadels. When planning and development lead to the conversion of office space to residential space in the financial district of Manhattan, the result is a further separation of those working there, now living there also, from the rest of the city. The full range of facilities is provided here: Concerts are given in the Crystal Palace at the center of Battery Park City, shopping is provided there, restaurants are open to all hours; intensive gentrification in surrounding sites and comprehensively planned new development come together to create an island of prosperity and peace. These are citadels indeed in their strongest classical form: places where their residents can live isolated and protected from the outside world for months at a time, in which all their needs are provided internally in the spaces in which they are concentrated. The luxury part of the quartered city has indeed become a luxury city entire to itself. It continues to need the services of a range of low-skilled workers, of course, for its daily chores, but they come in as needed and stay out when not; they certainly do not live within its confines. And as much as possible, their services are replaced by technologically sophisticated devices, card-operated entry gates, automated transportation, specialized cleaning machinery, and frozen food. Sigurd Grava (1991) describes Battery Park City in understated terms:

The major issue, in the opinion of most urban analysts, is the current exclusivity or isolation of the development. This is the case in a physical as well as social sense. Battery Park City today is an enclave [sic], a refined space that is not easily accessible nor particularly inviting to outsiders. The West Street chasm [its only
land border] is enough to deter all but the most purposeful passersby. . . . For those who do make it across, there are only a few attractions. . . . The outsiders can sit in the Winter Garden for a while or stare at the incredibly luxurious yachts, but the recreational possibilities are soon exhausted. . . . The restaurants and bars tend to be at the plush end of the scale. The residential areas are perceived as expensive dormitories or fancy shelters for downtown bankers. . . . This is not necessarily a problem for those who wish to work and live in an exclusive, isolated, and protected environment. (p. 11)

A good bit of attention has been focused recently on the conceptualization of "fortified enclaves" or "walled communities."17 The phenomenon is directly related to the separation described above; walls and fortifications are indeed, at least symbolically, the boundaries of the exclusionary enclaves, the totalizing suburbs, and the new citadels. But the issue is not simply one of physical separation. All areas of concentration have boundaries, walls around them, that may or may not be physical walls.18 For those without physical barriers separating them, social patterns and even legal restrictions may be in place that define those areas of concentration as sharply as if there were physical walls: Under apartheid in South Africa, no walls separated African from White from Indian from Colored areas, but everyone knew where the boundaries were, and any non-White found in the wrong place at the wrong time was subject to immediate arrest. On the West Side of Manhattan, 125th Street is recognized as the beginning of West Harlem going north and 96th Street as the beginning of Spanish Harlem on the East Side, but these are streets with normal traffic lights, not walls. Freeways marked the boundaries of the curfew areas around South Central Los Angeles in 1989; they constituted barriers, if penetrable ones, to those going elsewhere. Try to get into a high-rise luxury apartment building in New York City or London or Paris, with a doorman and likely a private security guard in the lobby, without living there or having demonstrable business there, and you will not succeed, despite the absence of a physical wall.

Although boundaries or walls may be similar in their function of keeping outsiders out, they are not all similar in the relationship between insiders and outsiders. When a public housing project in Los Angeles votes to have a fence erected around it restricting entry to keep drug dealers out, or when a neighborhood in the East Village of New York City puts a banner across a street, such as "SPECULATORS KEEP OUT: THIS IS OUR COMMUNITY," its formal act is akin to that of the residents of a luxury high-rise asking for identification of visitors, but its reasons for doing so are quite different; its relationship to the rest of society is one of powerlessness rather than of power. Thus, a fortified ghetto is a rare occurrence; it occurs when a poor community, in part emulating what is observed elsewhere, attempts to protect itself from incursions either by higher income gentrifiers or lower class criminal elements.19

So fortification is not a matter just of physical boundaries or walls, nor are all walls or fortifications alike. The need to differentiate creates the most difficulties, not in differentiating between ghettos and citadels, that is, at the extremes; here the differences are clear. The difference in the barriers established
around an exclusionary enclave and those around a citadel are harder to distin-
guish, in part simply because the borderline between the two is hardly a clear-cut
one. Citadels are where control functions are exercised, but control is exercised
hierarchically, and the top of the ladder may be variously defined. Perhaps “key”
decisions are made on Wall Street or in the International Financial Center, but
top managers just below that step live in New Jersey and may commute in or
may live in what is functionally a totalizing suburb on the west shore of the
Hudson River across from Manhattan. Battery Park City has elegant and
high-priced housing, but in Tribeca right next door, equally luxurious and
expensive development is taking place. Right outside some of the priciest of the
new citadels in Sao Paulo, the process of gentrification is taking place, as it is
across the railway station from Shinjuku; residents of Renaissance Center in
Detroit have direct access to Greektown for lunch or dinner. The areas being
gentrified are used in part by those living in the citadels (e.g., for restaurants or
entertainment); they themselves may take on the attributes of exclusionary
enclaves as prices rise. The exact boundary between the two will be fluctuating.

Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between Battery Park City and
gentrified areas such as Tribeca and exclusive suburbs such as Scarsdale and
fortified suburbs or edge cities such as White Plains, between not only Renais-
sance Center and Greektown but also between Renaissance Center and the
exclusive suburbs ringing Detroit and the private walled developments increas-
ingly present in and near them. The difference does not lie in either of the two
growing phenomena: the fortification or walling in or walling out, or the
totalizing nature of their environments; these are characteristics both of the
totalizing suburb and of the citadel (and, in different fashion, of the exclusionary
ghetto). The difference lies in the economic and political and social relationship
to power and wealth.

How is this manifest? It is not so much at the edges as at the centers of
areas of spatial concentration. It is not the essence of the citadel that it
excludes the typical edge city resident, if they choose to enter and pay the
heavy prices demanded. Few of those at the peak of economic and political
power will, however, choose to live in exclusionary suburbs, even totalized ones;
they will either remain in citadels in the center of the city itself or will have the
ability to create their own individual separate citadel with acreage and architec-
tural designs to give them the protection and separation provided more collec-
tively by the citadel. Thus, the totalizing suburb will have few or none of the
very rich; the citadels of wealth, however, may include some not at the pinnacle.

It may also be that the balance between production\textsuperscript{20} and consumption\textsuperscript{21} is
different in the citadel than in the totalizing suburb. The classic suburb had a
strong preponderance of residences; the effort of planners and municipal offici-
als was to induce businesses to locate there. The traditional separation of uses
underlying U.S. zoning patterns fed into this pattern. In the citadels, the opposite
is more likely to be the case: business comes first, residences are added later.
This is certainly the pattern in Battery Park City and was the pattern in La
Defense. Whether it is a general characteristic of the citadels of the world requires more careful empirical study.

I suspect, in the end, that citadels will have, in one form or another, almost all the physical characteristics that Teresa Caldiera (1996) describes for them in Sao Paulo:

Private property for collective use . . . physically isolated, either by walls or empty spaces or other design devices . . . turned inwards . . . controlled by armed guards and security systems which enforce rules of inclusion and exclusion. . . . Independent of the surroundings . . . socially homogeneous . . . conferring high status . . . isolation means separation from those considered to be socially inferior. . . . The enclaves [sic] are not subordinate either to public streets or to surrounding buildings and institutions. (pp. 308, 311, 314)\textsuperscript{22}

The developments described above—the growth of the excluded ghetto, the exclusionary enclave and totalizing suburb, the citadel, the walling and the totalizing tendencies—are integrally related to each other. To start with the totalizing suburb: For the first time, it is not an overwhelmingly residentially led process but represents a move of white-collar and professional jobs out of the central city—and not just jobs in manufacturing and retailing. This I take to be the analytic heart of the descriptive term edge cities. Garreau (1991) lists five necessary criteria for what a community needs to fit the term:

1. 5 million square feet of office space,
2. 600,000 square feet of retailing,
3. more jobs than bedrooms,
4. perception as one place, and
5. recent origin.\textsuperscript{23}

But #2, #4, and #5 are all true of most large suburbs. The others, #1 and #3, largely duplicate each other and are the crucial factors: These are suburbs of work as well as residence. All of life can be contained within them; they are a total environment.

And work moves out, not for physical reasons (as factories did, which needed more horizontal space for assembly lines, etc.) but for social reasons: the better "quality of life" of those involved in the work and the lower land prices and costs of doing business there, a good bit of which is a response to the perceived threat of crime and lower class behavior in the central cities. This is, in turn, a function of the growth of the new ghettos and is a differentiated form of the fortified enclave, one in which the fortification comes from distance rather than walls and relies on social and frequently legal (as in exclusionary zoning) barriers to entry rather than gates or security forces.

Racial and economic discrimination, which in the central cities have resulted in the growth of both ghettos and fortified enclaves, have also historically explained much of the attractiveness of racially restricted suburbs for Whites; that pattern is not new. But as ghettoization and its consequences increase, and
as that pattern seems more and more intractable and permanent, that attractiveness also increases. So the growth of the new ghetto creates a further increase in the creation of fortified enclaves, and both, in turn, accentuate the push out of the central city. At the same time, service firms seeking the advantages to be found in the protected enclaves in which white-collar work is increasingly being done find real estate costs in those limited enclaves exorbitant. Although their work may be closely linked to that of the major firms and services still located within the enclaves of the central city, new communication technologies permit them to be located within commuting distance of the major centers yet on the cheaper land found in the surrounding edge cities. Thus, the pull of lower business costs and the push of increased segregation within the city combine to produce both new scales and new forms of suburbanization.

The growth of the citadels, although chronologically it perhaps becomes apparent after the development of the excluded ghetto and the exclusionary suburb (after all, it contributes to what the citadel is there for if its existence is not apparent), is close to the motor of the entire process. For the concentration of wealth and power in the citadels comes not simply from a growth in overall wealth but from changes in its distribution. And certainly the concentration of power in the citadels comes at the expense of the power of other segments of society. The underlying processes have much to do with globalization and post-Fordist methods of production, which have accentuated to extremes the polarization of society. On one hand, they are major factors in producing the new urban poverty, whose spatial reflection is the excluded ghetto (see Mingione, 1996). On the other hand, they have reinforced an international global elite, socially a jet set, economically the leaders of the multinational corporations, politically the decision makers of the Group of Seven (or eight or nine). John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff (1982), in their original discussion of the citadel, emphasized its role as the touching-down place for this global elite. But it is not only the global elite who are involved; real estate speculators, national financiers, or top-flight entertainers may be as much nationally as internationally based. But they are all mobile and insulated in every way, including spatially, from the rest of society. The spatial separation that then characterizes the lives of other groups may well be considered to start at the top.

The spatial patterns with which this article has been concerned are clearest and have been most studied in the United States. Whether they are an international pattern, universally true, apparent in the Third World as well as the First (and now the Second), remains unclear. Excellent comparative studies have begun to grapple with the question; the answers are not yet in. Two things seem certain. First, there are tendencies in the direction described here in almost every major city in the world. Second, racism plays a unique role in limning the pattern in the United States. The relationship of immigration and the spatial concentration of immigrants to these tendencies is now a matter of major concern both in Europe and in the United States. Certainly, much more research remains to be done before the entire picture is clear.
NOTES

1. The formulation was first suggested in Marcuse (1989).
2. The seminal text was in Aglietta (1979). For a view of the subsequent discussion, see Amin (1994).
3. The literature beginning with an urban focus, much of it coming from geography and urban studies, is richer here than the globalization literature; see, for instance, the treatment of gentrification, which both as an economic and a spatial phenomenon has been extensively and well analyzed (e.g., see Smith & Williams, 1986, and the growing attention to fortified enclaves cited below). In a sense, this article is an attempt to bring the two streams of thought, the urban analysis and the discussions of globalization, more closely together. It picks up one of the two major threads largely initiated by Friedmann and Wolff’s (1982) paper, which dealt with internal urban spatial structure; indeed, the term citadel was first used, in somewhat the same sense used here, by Friedmann. More attention has been paid to the separation of residential areas within cities than to the distribution of business activities within them. That is true of my own prior work also; for my first discussion of the issue of the separation of areas of different forms of business activity to form their own separated areas of concentration within the city, see Marcuse (1994). For comments on the other stream, which deals with the hierarchy of cities, see the text above.
4. Recall the formulation of Louis Wirth (1928/1956), which in hindsight raises many of these questions at once: “The Jews drift into the ghetto . . . for the same reasons that the Italians live in Little Sicily, the Negroes in the black belt, and the Chinese in Chinatown” (p. 283).
5. I have developed these definitions in Marcuse (1997a). Boal (1978) made an excellent earlier attempt at definitional clarity in dealing with these questions.
6. The Nazis’ treatment of the Jewish ghettos of Eastern Europe is such an extreme form of this pattern that it stands by itself; fear may have been used in the popular propaganda to incite enmity to their populations, but it was hardly fear that led to the Holocaust.
7. The phrase was popularized by Garreau (1991).
8. Among the best recent studies are Goldsmith and Blakely (1992) and Bullard, Grigsby, and Lee (1994).
9. Appropriately enough, the other contender for that honor is probably Friedmann and Wolff’s (1982) “world cities” or Saskia Sassen’s (1991) “global cities.”
10. I have begun to explore the shifting nature and views of the U.S. ghetto in Marcuse (1997a, in press).
11. Wilson (1987) remains the most important work.
12. For a sensitive discussion of the multiple dimensions of hypersegregation and exactly what should be measured and how, see, apart from Massey and Denton (1993), Jencks (1991).
13. For one critique of that policy, see Marcuse (1997a). For a more complex view that differentiates between economic isolation, political autonomy, and community but is tentative in its conclusions, see Goldsmith (1979). His subsequent article (Goldsmith, 1982) takes a much stronger position against simple policies such as the empowerment zone program of today.
15. The point is generally acknowledged today. David Rusk (1993), the former mayor of Albuquerque, cites as one of his 24 “Lessons from Urban America” that “racial prejudice has shaped growth patterns,” and he describes the White suburbs of American cities as deriving from that pattern.
16. In a recent experience of mine, a Long Island community within commuting range of New York City was charged with discriminating against Blacks, only a tiny number of whom lived there. The response was to point to the much larger number of Hispanic residents as demonstrating that the community did not discriminate against minorities. All minorities are not alike for these purposes.
18. I have discussed the nature of such walls in a number of papers, most recently Marcuse (1997b).
19. Although it will not be further discussed here, the literature on public housing has many examples; see Leavitt and Goldstein’s (1990) work on public housing projects in Los Angeles and (in a perverse manner) Oscar Newman’s (1972) work on public housing in New York City.
20. If production is the correct word to use for the economic activity of the citadel, it is in the sense of affecting economic decisions, but in the sense of producing use values, it only is indirectly. But that is partly a philosophical issue and not for exploration here.
21. This is treating residence as consumption, as well as the purchase and use of traditional consumer goods. Housing is indeed an investment as well as a consumer good, and whether display is consumption may be questioned. But the definition of consumption also needs more careful exploration than can be given here.
22. Caldiera (1996) recounts a visit of Garreau to Sao Paulo, helping to market three new private developments there, legitimating them by reference to the growth of “edge cities” in the United States. I suspect that in such endeavors, class differentiation in the various forms of enclaves and citadels is slurred over.
23. The key portion of Garreau’s (1991) definition of edge cities is given on pages 6-7.
24. See, for instance, O’Loughlin and Friedrichs (1996). Loic Wacquant’s (1993) work is among the most insightful I have seen. The study Ronald van Kempen and I are undertaking, soon to appear in book form with Blackwell Publishers in London, will hopefully make a contribution also.
25. The single exception is, of course, South Africa.
26. See, for instance, the studies cited in Wacquant (1993) and Van Kempen and Bolt’s (1997 [this issue]) work on Turks in the Netherlands.

REFERENCES


Leavitt, J., & Goldstein, C. (1990, August). The doors are closed, the lights are out. *architecture california*, p. 56.


