Enclaves Yes, Ghettoes, No: Segregation and the State

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Peter Marcuse

Spatial clustering seems to be, but is not, an inevitable accompaniment of urban life. They result in all forms of clustering, some of which have drawn particular attention, but the dividing line between those as to which public concern is indicated and others is not always clear. I speak of segregation as involuntary, or better yet, hierarchical; voluntary, non-hierarchical clustering may always be present, but is not generally objectionable. One of the purposes of this paper is to provide a framework within which segregation that is socially acceptable may be differentiated from that which is undesirable.

A second purpose of this paper is to illuminate the role of the state in making all forms of segregation feasible. The forces that produce segregation—undesirable clustering—may indeed be strong, and have been dominant historically. But they depend on the state for the implementation of segregation, and the state has it within its power to as well to end segregation.

This paper develops the argument in four steps: it begins with a formal definition of segregation, so as to be clear about what is and what is not meant by the term. Then it examines the origins of clustering, attempting at the same time be explicit about the public policy position and the values underlying it that the paper assumes. It then traces the role of the state in implementing segregation, through a history focusing on the United States. Finally, it suggests how, with what tools, the state could end segregation.

What is segregation? Formal definitions.

It seems to me very important to be clear on definitions, not just for analytic purposes, but also to be clear on desired policy outcomes. In particular, we sometimes hear formulations such as “self-segregation,” or “voluntary ghettos,” or “upper class ghettos.” I think such formulations are mischievous; they are analytically oxymorons, and policy-wise insidious. For I believe clarity in the concepts involved would suggest using the terms “segregation” and “ghetto” for patterns that are undesirable, and treating other forms of clustering in a more nuanced fashion.

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1 A recent example, in an otherwise excellent collection, are articles in Urban Segregation and the Welfare State, Inequality and Exclusion in Western Cities, Sako Musterd and Wim Ostendorf (Eds.), 1998, Routledge, London and New York. Jews in Toronto are called “segregated,” although their incomes are well above average and there is no evidence of residential discrimination.
So, operationally, I will use the following definitions:

In process terms:

*Clustering* is the coming together of a population group in space. It is the generic term for the formation of any area of spatial concentration.

*Segregation* is the process by which a population group is forced, i.e. involuntarily, to cluster in a defined spatial area, in a ghetto. It is the process of formation and maintenance of a *ghetto*.

*Congregating* is the voluntary coming together of a population group for purposes of self-protection and advancement of its own interests, other than through domination or exclusion. It is the process of formation of an *enclave*.

*Quartering* is the division of urban space into quarters apparently immediately by operation of the private market in real estate and housing, based on the income or wealth of households.

*Walling out* is the voluntary coming together of a population group for purposes of self-protection and advancement of its own interests through the mechanism of excluding others. It is the process of formation of an *exclusionary enclave*.

*Desegregation* is the elimination of barriers to free mobility for residents of a *ghetto*.

*Fortification* is the voluntary coming together of a population group for purposes of protecting a dominant self-interest and strengthening that domination. It is the process of formation of a *citadel*.

In spatial terms:

A *cluster* is an area of spatial concentration of a population group. It is the generic term covering any concentration of members of a particular group, however defined, in space, at a scale larger than a building.
A *quarter* is an area of spatial concentration by income or wealth apparently immediately created by the operation of the private market in real estate and housing, based on the income or wealth of households.

A *ghetto* is an area of spatial concentration used by forces within the dominant society to separate and to limit a particular population group, externally defined as racial or ethnic or foreign, held to be, and treated as, inferior by the dominant society.²

An *enclave* is an area of spatial concentration in which members of a particular population group, self-defined by ethnicity or religion or otherwise, congregate as a means of protecting and enhancing their economic, social, political and/or cultural development.

An *exclusionary enclave* is an area of spatial concentration in which members of a particular population group, defined by its position of superiority in power, wealth, or status in relation to its neighbors, cluster as a means of protecting that position.

A *citadel* is an area of spatial concentration in which members of a particular population group, defined by its position of superiority in power, wealth, or status in relation to its neighbors, cluster as a means of protecting, displaying, and enhancing that position.

Empirically, we often find spatial patterns that share the characteristics of more than one of these spatial definitions; in fact, they should be taken as ideal types, rather than descriptions of any one even of the examples given.

One basis for the policy conclusion that segregation and ghettos are bad, and perhaps for taking positions on exclusionary enclaves, is that *involuntary* allocation of space to any group is undesirable in a democratic society. (I will take up below the question of whether market allocation is voluntary or involuntary.) A second basis relies on the desirability for diversity, for mixing, for open interchange and communication, among population groups in a democratic society. This desirability of diversity, and the relation of spatial configurations to it, is a much more complicated matter, and has to do with public policy as to, for instance, citadels and enclaves. I will not go into

² There is a further distinction to be made between a traditional ghetto, integrated in the dominant society economically, and a new, excluded, ghetto, not so integrated, but that is not at the center of the argument here. See Marcuse, Peter. "The Enclave, the Citadel, and the Ghetto: What Has Changed in the Post-Fordist U.S. City." *Urban Affairs Review*, vol. 33, No. 2, November 1997, pp. 228-264
it here; the first ground is clear enough, and the policies required to meet it pressing enough, so that
the other may await a future discussion.

The origins of clustering and segregation

If we look at the broad patterns of spatial clustering in cities historically, I think we may discern a
general pattern that will help us differentiate acceptable from unacceptable forms of segregation.

Cities may be, and have been, divided along a number of lines forming a variety of patterns of clustering.
Many, but not all, of them are social: divisions brought about by the conscious acts of their residents and
those who hold power over or among them. We might list the possibilities as including divisions along
lines of nationality, class, income, wealth, occupation, religion, “race,” color, ethnicity, language, age,
household composition, personal cultural preference, life style; other categories can no doubt be defined.

But the range of possible categories could theoretically be infinite. We believe, for purposes of policy-
relevant analysis, they fall into three quite separate and distinguishable groups/ideal types divisions by
culture, by functional economic role, and by position in the hierarchy of power.

Cultural divisions are usually easily visible: by differences in language, in costume, in architectural style,
for instance. They may include divisions by ethnicity, by country or nationality or tribe of origin or
parentage or descent, by religion or belief, by life-style. (We avoid using the term “race,” and see it as
conflating cultural division, falsely defined, with differences of status; see below.) While some of these
differences may appropriately be called “cultural” in the strict sense, and others may be the products of
manipulation, idiosyncratic choice, or some combination of these, the key element that differentiates
cultural divisions from functional or status divisions is that they are based neither on differences in
relationship to economic production nor on relationships of power. One ethnic or religious group may in
fact also play a different economic role, and be socially subordinated, to another group; but there are

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3 I have an extended discussion of historical patterns in Marcuse, Peter. Forthcoming. “The Divided City in History.” Chapter 3 in
University Press.

4 The conceptualization is similar to that others have made, e.g., Archer, 1995, speaks of three axes of differentiation: “collective
identity, function, and distinction of elite from non-elite” (pp. 5-6).

5 Glazer and Moynihan distinguish three “conflicts” dividing society in the United States: “interest”, “ethnicity”, and “racism.” It is a
confusion of categories; but the distinction between ethnicity and racism is important. Their usage of the term “race,” apparently
identifying it with color, differs from its use here, but their distinction between ethnic differences and separations caused by racism is
important. Both relate to a dividing line that looks very similar; but the fact that one self-generates the line, the other imposes it from
the outside, needs constantly to be kept in mind. It is a key difference between enclaves and ghettos, as we use those terms. See
the Introduction.
elements of cultural differences that are independent of these economic and social differences; they may reflect them, but are not identical with them. Worship, music, parenting, language, history, holidays, clothing, family relations, are not dependent on their economic productivity for their hold on people, nor do they require a relationship of superiority or inferiority to outsiders for their strength (although such feelings may easily be incorporated within them). Even the life-style differences that the real estate market takes into account producing the “spatial segregation of people by household type, family status, and age, [so that] ’the different [age] cohorts take up separate quarters’” (Kostof, 1992, p.121), are innocuous: non-hierarchical.

*Divisions by functional role* are the result of economic logic, either physical or organizational: the divisions between farms and factories and residential areas, for instance. They include separate locations for different guilds, for instance, or the separation of service from manufacturing, or wholesaling from retailing. Residentially, the need of workers in particular industries to be located in accessible relations to their places of employment may create residential divisions, an extreme example of which would be company-sponsored housing developments. Areas may be set aside for defense, and those involved in defense located there; the externalities of certain industries or occupations may require that those involved in them be near each other, or clustered along transportation routes making them readily accessible to interchange with each other. Such differences are essentially independent of cultural differences, and do not (at least essentially--status differentiates may of course arise out of functional differences) denote relations of superiority or inferiority to other functions, simply differences.

Zoning is the accepted legal embodiment of such divisions. That zoning should be by function, generally defined as economic use (residential from heavy industrial from light industrial from retail from wholesaling from offices), is not as self-evident as it might seem; “performance zoning,” for instance, attempts to define permitted uses of land not by their economic nature but by their environmental impact, traffic generated, shadows cast, air circulation impeded, green space occupied, etc. And, while “use” may separate manufacturing from retail from residential, it has never been quite clear why residential use for one family should be a different type of use than residential use by two or three families. Be that as it may, separation by function, by use, is generally accepted today as in general an appropriate division within a city.

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6 There are indeed situations where cultural differences may be created in order to achieve economic or social results: the revival of religious Judaism among some Russians seeking improvement in their economic conditions, for instance, or a politician discovering ethnic roots to solidify support among a particular community in an election bid. Cultural differences may be used instrumentally; but most cultural differences exist independent of individual purposive choice.

7 The United States Supreme Court struggled with this issue in its landmark decision legitimating zoning under the United States Constitution, Euclid vs. Ambler, and some commentators today consider it to have been mistaken in accepting this particular
Differences in hierarchical status, reflecting and reinforcing relationships of power, of domination, exploitation, state service, are exemplified by the imperial enclave in a colonial town, or the black townships of South Africa, as extreme examples. But security-guarded luxury residences near central business districts reflect and support relationships of power just as much, as do working-class quarters or “slums.” Class is a widely relevant current line of differentiation which involves status in the sense here used. Income is often a good surrogate for status, but not identical with it; the same is true of occupation, and even of the cluster of indicators generally known as SES, socio-economic status, which are simply, however, good, indicators of an underlying relationship, not descriptive of that relationship itself. Power can exist along a multitude of dimensions: military power, political power, economic power, social power, legal power (of which slavery is the extreme case) are examples.

These three divisions both overlap and contradict each other; their intertwining is one of the fascinations of the history of cities. Cultural differences may be used to reinforce differences of status to the point that the two are at first glance identical; this is notoriously the case with black/white, imperial/indigenous, Jewish/Arab, differences, which frequently reinforce differences of status to the point that the two are at first glance identical; but those divisions often interfere with the effective lines of functional division: groups differentiated by culture and status need to work and be near each other for efficient production. Relations of status and function often conflict in their impact on space: employers like to have their employees close to their work, but not close to them. Cultural affinities may contradict status differences: within each group, linked by culture, there can be major differences of class as well as of economic function. Interdependence and mutual hostility often go hand in hand. Function, status, and culture were largely merged in imperial enclaves in colonial territories in the past, and may be merging again in today’s economies: as Cross and Waldinger point out, “the ethnic division of labor is, in this sense, the central division of labor in the postindustrial city” (Cross and Waldinger, 1992, p.173). Since functions are not neutral in the hierarchy of status, the three divisions come together. And so on. The permutations are manifold.

As a further complicating factor: the role of space is not a constant one. Space is socially created; its role shifts with shifting social constellations: cultural, functional, of status and power. Of course topography, geographical considerations, influence the location of spatial divisions, and will often correlate to social divisions, e.g. upper classes will live in locations of higher environmental amenity. But even such
correlations are fluid and subject to social and economic change: thus waterfront locations may be put to
industrial use and occupied by longshore workers in one society, claimed for luxury housing and
recreational use in another. Historically viewed, different patterns of division are differentially reflected,
fortified, contradicted, by space. The general truth was over-stated by Robert Park more than forty years
ago: “social relations are.. frequently and ... inevitably correlated with spatial relations” (Park, 1952,
p.XX; the contradictory adverbs are in the original). Frequently, yes; inevitably, no, certainly not directly:
the slave-master relationship can coexist with slaves living next door to masters, as well as if they live in
separate districts of the city. And the direction of influence is reciprocal: social relations determine spatial
relations, but these in turn influence, generally but not always reinforcing, social relations. Where the
underlying social relations are in flux, or where the allocation and use of space does not closely reflect
those relations, there is likely to be conflict, again reflected both in disputes over space and over the
underlying relationships themselves. The building of walls (see Marcuse, 1997a) to create or enforce
divisions may be as much a reflection of the instability of underlying relationships as of the hardness of
the divisions within them.

Granting these complications, I would suggest:

Divisions, clustering, by status, reflecting and reinforcing hierarchical relationships of power are
unacceptable from a public policy point of view, and the appropriate targets of state prohibition; cultural
or social clusters that do not reinforce such relationships of power are not.

This formulation does not suggest that cultural or functional divisions, even if entirely voluntary, are
necessarily desirable. Measures to lessen their impact, as through programs of multi-culturalism, may
indeed be desirable from a public policy point of view—to promote understanding, to facilitate economic
integration, to increase opportunities, to enrich culture. But there is, to a lawyer’s mind, a sharp difference
between penalizing and prohibiting hierarchical discrimination, on the one side, and promoting various
forms of functional economic and social/cultural integration on the other. And measures to reduce
segregation should stand on a quite different public policy footing from measures to promote inter-
cultural understanding: prohibiting racial discrimination in housing, or prohibiting exclusionary zoning,
have different standing from programs that provide education on different ethnic groups holidays or
music or cooking.

The state’s role in imposing segregation
While divisions by function and cultural divisions are in general voluntary, divisions by status are not. No group desires low status; it is imposed on them. While those of higher status maintain their separation voluntarily, they need the means to impose it on those of lower status against their wills. Thus divisions by status require, implicitly or explicitly, the use of force, and in a civilized society such force is (at least in theory) a monopoly of the state. State action may (or may not) also be involved in regulating cultural divisions, and often is involved in shaping functional divisions; but in those cases the state is acting in a purely regulatory role, with the consent and for the benefit of all participants. The source of the state’s ability to impose status divisions in space upon its residents may have its source in the simple control of physical force, as was true in many early societies in which monarchs partitioned space for their own benefit, or the state may be itself responding to the desires of the holders of economic or political power, desires likewise reflected in parallel market patterns, and thus benefiting those outside the direct state apparatus. The state’s role in establishing the involuntary lines of division that reflect status/power is in both events central in the active process we call partitioning in our contributions to this book. It is this partitioning along lines of power, implemented by the state, with which we are primarily concerned, for it is they which we consider the most threatening to the prospects for a democratic and just city. And they may be particularly damaging when they use and are reinforced by divisions of culture and/or function.

Examples from the experience in the United States are readily at hand.

In the United States the black ghetto, properly so called, was created, imposed, from the outside, and the instrument of that imposition was the state. The usefulness of division between whites and blacks for some employers, the economic advantage of some whites, the racist individual patterns of behavior by whites engendered by decades of slavery, the continued disadvantages suffered by the victims of those decades, were all causative elements in the creation of the ghetto. But indispensable to its creation was the ability of those benefiting from segregation to use the instrumentalities of government to impose and enforce patterns of separation on blacks.

Only a brief account is necessary to show the role of government in the United States in fostering ghettoization:

- In city after city, local governments enacted zoning ordinances that explicitly provided that certain areas should be occupied exclusively by whites. While the practice of zoning using race as
a formal criteria was finally ruled unconstitutional in Buchanan vs. Warley\(^8\) in 1917, “the construction of the ghetto continued apace despite Buchanan, and levels of black-white segregation in U.S. cities rose steadily.”\(^9\)

- Zoning has remained a major device for excluding blacks and restricting their alternatives to living in ghettos. Devices include large-lot zoning, prohibiting multi-family construction or limiting areas available for it, or retaining discretionary powers in a local zoning board to permit or reject applications for construction.\(^10\)

- Courts, the third branch of government in the United States’ federal system, provided judicial enforcement for restrictive covenants,\(^11\) for many years a major device by which blacks were excluded from large parts of cities and confined to areas of already black residence. Although the practice violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866,\(^12\) it was not until 1948 that the practice was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court.\(^13\)

- City planning has in the past contributed significantly to limiting the opportunities for the location of residences for blacks. Designs for “neighborhood unit” developments, the location of boulevards and major roadways, the location and timing of infrastructure provision, often conformed to essentially racist patterns.\(^14\) Robert Moses’s biases, as Construction Coordinator for the City of New York and in multiple other public roles, to preserve existing segregated racial patterns and uses, and in fact to accentuate them through disproportionate displacement of blacks through public works, have been extensively documented.\(^15\)

- Red-lining. The bulk of private single-family housing built in the last fifty years has been built with Federal government mortgage assistance, largely in the form of insurance through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Appraisal by the FHA of the value of a home was essential to get that assistance. In that appraisal, the FHA Manual for Underwriters stated: “important among adverse influences…are…infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality groups…” It further favored “…recorded deed restrictions..[to] include the following: …prohibition of the occupancy of properties except by the race for which they are intended.”\(^16\)

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\(^8\) Buchanan vs. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
\(^9\) Massey and Denton, American Apartheid., p. 188.
\(^11\) Restrictive covenants are agreements incorporated in deeds of transfer of real property, in this case restricting subsequent transfers to persons not of the Caucasian race.
\(^12\) Massey and Denton, p. 188.
\(^15\) Caro, Robert A. 1974. The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Caro’s research has recently been called into question, but the basic outlines he has presented have held up.
• The Federal public housing program, adopted in the United States Housing Act of 1937, provided for the construction of social housing in what is still the major program for government construction of housing in the nation. At the outset, and until the 1950’s, such housing was uniformly constructed on a segregated basis: separate, and rarely equal. Public housing projects are today often at the heart of the black ghetto in major cities.\(^\text{17}\)

• The urban renewal program, adopted under Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, was the basis for slum clearance and redevelopment in the United States, and became quickly known as a program for Negro removal. Although coupled in the same piece of legislation with public housing, it destroyed more housing than it created in its early years, with a widely disparate impact on black housing, forcing black residents from often integrated areas desired for “higher” uses into areas already of minority concentration.

• The Federal highway construction program, massively subsidized with Federal funds after 1954, was a sine qua non for the development of the sprawling and all-white suburbs of the post-war years.\(^\text{18}\) A significant part of the motivation for moves to the suburbs was to escape the growing black populations of the inner cities, relying on these highways and leaving the inner cities, in turn, to house ever larger concentrations of black residents.\(^\text{19}\) The movement of employers and jobs to the suburbs aggravated the impact on segregation of blacks.

These are, in a sense, the explicit, affirmative actions the state has taken that have fostered segregation in the United States. But one could make a argument that goes further as to the state’s role, and one that would apply as much to most countries in the world today. Simply put, no residential pattern, whether fostering or counter-acting residential segregation, could exist without fundamental state action. To begin with, the entire legal structure that makes development possible is based on laws promulgated and enforced by the state: laws at to the right of property ownership, financial instruments, evictions and actions for possession, prohibitions against trespass, with the state-established courts, police, sheriffs, and law enforcement agencies to back them up. Then the laying out of roads, the provision of infrastructure, the granting or withholding of development permissions, the levying of taxes and the provision of municipal services necessary for any type of urban life, are functions of the state. No “private” market


\(^{18}\) The best account is perhaps Gelfand, Mark. 1975. A Nation of Cities: The Federal Government and Urban America, 1933-1965, New York, Oxford University Press. See also Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, supra.

\(^{19}\) jon a. powell has recently highlighted the argument that “one of the central forces behind the sprawl explosion is white aversion to blacks, which is supported and reinforced by ... state and local zoning boards.” “Achieving Racial Justice: What’s Sprawl Got to Do With It?” Poverty & Race, September/October 1999, vol. 8, no. 5, p. 3.
could function is the state did not enforce the provisions of contracts and afford remedies for their breach. And, in general, the definition of those individual rights that will and will not be protected by the state, often contained in constitutional provisions, are functions of the state. It is clearly within the ultimate powers of the state to permit or prohibit segregation. If segregation then takes place in any society, it is with the tacit, if not the explicit, sanction of the state.

The state’s policy responses to segregation

Having defined the type of clustering that should be the target of public policy, what kinds of state action might be considered to effectuate that policy?

Some measures at the local level can have a real impact, since in most countries land use is most directly a matter of local jurisdiction. Measures might include:

- Expanded provision of social housing in different urban areas (not only in areas that already have substantial social rented dwellings), planned as part of an overall program for the mainstream of housing provision (Marcuse 1998). In areas that still have to be developed social housing should also be included. In the Netherlands, for instance, on large building sites adjacent to existing cities, 30 per cent of the new dwellings are provided as affordable.

- Use of tax incentives to promote local economic development and job creation/expansion, within a broad integrative framework. This will give possibilities for unemployed people to get a job and a higher income and to move to better dwellings, permitting them to move from distressed areas, and permitting those remaining in such areas to change their economic status.

- Progressive real estate taxes, that would make local real-property-based taxes progressive, redistributing some of the benefit of land appreciation to the entire community; Porto Alegre, in Brazil, has begun such a practice successfully.

- Capital gains and anti-speculation taxes, such as have been adopted in some places in the United States, which impose a high tax on profits resulting from purchase and sale of a property within a short time, at high levels if no significant improvements have been made justifying the profit; such taxes discourage speculation and displacement from rising prices in areas of gentrification.

- Inter-municipal agreements with respect to housing low-income households. Such agreements might especially be useful between cities and suburbs. Often, lower-income
households are located in central cities, while suburban environments house the middle-income and higher income households. Building low-rent dwellings in suburbs, and giving high-income households the opportunity to move to central city areas by offering them good alternatives in these areas, may foster de-segregation.

- Inter-municipal agreements (or regulation at higher levels of government) can be used to prevent destructive competition among cities, such as often results in tax incentives or other financial incentives offered to businesses seeking new locations, generally resulting in a regressive redistribution of tax benefits and an increasing disparity among aided and unaided businesses and their employees.

- Provision of infrastructure and land use controls for local and equitable benefit, so that development desired for its contribution to equity and integration are favored and support for citadel-like construction of insulated enclaves of the rich and powerful are discouraged. Provision of mass transportation with stations and stops in different kinds of areas may lead to the increase of economic activities in neighbourhoods that did not have good connections before.

- Regional planning and land use controls geared to equalizing benefits and burdens of development, so that suburbs are not permitted to escape the costs of urbanization while reaping all of their benefits. Proposals and policies discussed in Minnesota and by the Regional Plan Association in New York are examples.

- Community information as to public decisions, with broad decentralized control over neighborhood developments, so that local communities can be enabled to resist segregating tendencies, whether gentrification or the dumping of undesired polluting or otherwise undesired facilities in already neglected ghetto or ghetto-like areas; New York City’s Fair Share regulations are intended to be a step in this direction.

- Expansive provision of public space and opportunity for public communication, so that the movement in the direction of private control, with its market-based tendencies to segregate, can be counter-acted, and the general sense of a diverse community be reinforced;

- Strong anti-discrimination action, as is particularly needed, and extensively if still inadequately used, in the United States.

- Anti-red-lining and pro-green-lining legislation, often part of such efforts. Thus, the use of zoning and land use controls to steer new construction and commercial development in desired areas and limit it in undesired areas (see, e.g. Marcuse 1984-5);

- Location of public facilities and services at borders between partitions, to help unify disparate areas spatially and bring their residents together more.
• Control of pollution to achieve environmental justice.

At the national level, the following possibilities might be considered:

• Strengthening national democratic control of the provision of services and goods to meet basic needs, in ways that couple the contributions of the traditional welfare state with the efficiencies of the market – for instance, large scale national public subsidies for housing, with either direct provision by government or by competitive private builders. The welfare state had been an almost unquestioned part of the post-war political compromise in every Western European country, but is much on the defensive there, and is being limited more and more around the world; in some, such as the United States, it has never been fully accepted.

• Redistribution of nationally-generated and collected resources among localities so as to equalize resources and prevent partitioning resulting from real or perceived local fiscal crisis;

• The banning of competition among cities – including giving tax advantages, under-cost sales of land or provision of infrastructure — where such competition results in increasing inequalities both among and within cities, as it almost always does.

• Legalization of squatting through national legislation affecting land titles and evictions and prohibition on confiscation or buying up of land by non-farmers, actions against landlessness, land reform, thus keeping down the push pressure of rural immigration to the cities. Measures such as these, often as part of comprehensive restructuring of property rights and property reform, have been extensively done or are under consideration in countries as diverse as Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa. Care needs to be taken, however, that such measures, which improve living conditions while affecting segregation only in the long run, are coupled with longer-term spatial planning that will improve the opportunities for former squatters also to find decent housing outside of illegal settlements.

The range of policies that might reduce segregation should in fact include the wide variety of measures that would reduce that inequality which is the underlying cause of partitioning. In the long run, for instance, measures such as steeply progressive income taxes, protection of the rights of women, limitations on the concentration of ownership and control of economic activity, environmental protection measures taking into account the just distribution of burdens and benefits, would all also reduce segregation. To the extent that global/international pressures lead to or accentuate segregation, international agreements establishing standards and limits on private actions from outside national borders
should also be considered. For in a sense segregation may also be seen as a phenomenon at the international level, with immigration restrictions being in effect a form of state-enforced segregation. For after we have solved the problems of segregation within national borders, we should deal with segregation at the international level. But that brings us rather far from the focus of this conference.

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